

『不平等の罟』 Appendix

CORRUPTION, INEQUALITY, AND THE RULE OF LAW:

The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life

by Eric M. Uslaner

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Appendix

TABLE A1-1. *Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 and Corruption Perceptions Global Corruption Barometer 2004: Correlations*

Global Corruption Barometer Variables	TI Corruption Perceptions Index	Bribed Last Year Global Barometer	Corruption Affects Own Life Global Barometer
Grand corruption a problem	-.809	.430	.731
Petty corruption a problem	-.862	.512	.767
Corruption affects business environment	-.584	.359	.661
Corruption affects political life	-.512	.294	.572
Business corrupt	-.666	.388	.547
Political parties corrupt	-.622	.325	.633
Parliament corrupt	-.716	.388	.702
Military corrupt	-.610	.389	.600
Tax system corrupt	-.797	.495	.733
Customs officials corrupt	-.892	.670	.740
Education system corrupt	-.799	.475	.793
Legal system corrupt	-.858	.553	.739
Medical system corrupt	-.774	.454	.673
Police corrupt	-.847	.618	.767
Registry corrupt	-.852	.504	.715
Utilities corrupt	-.658	.341	.763
Media corrupt	-.165	.032	.302
NGOs corrupt	-.477	.164	.540
Religion corrupt	-.078	.172	.305

N = 61




FIGURE AI-1.




FIGURE AI-2.




FIGURE A1-3.




FIGURE A2-1.




FIGURE A2-2.




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


FIGURE A2-4.




FIGURE A2-5.




FIGURE A2-6.

TABLE A3-1. *Factor Analysis of Government Effectiveness Measures: World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2004*

Variable	Loading	Communality
Judicial independence	.919	.908
Efficiency of legal system	.976	.971
Efficiency of legislative system	.913	.852
Wastefulness of government spending	.876	.801
Favoritism of government decision-making	.942	.901
Transparency of government decision-making	.934	.883

TABLE A3-2. *Correlations of Corruption, Effective Government, and Failed State Indicators (2006)**

Indicator	Corruption TI 2005	Corruption TI 2005 Full Sample	Effective Government
Overall Failed States index	-.867	-.869	-.672
Uneven economic development among groups	-.801	-.797	-.620
Mounting demographic pressures	-.798	-.786	-.585
Massive movement of refugees	-.617	-.554	-.404
Legacy of vengeance: seeking group grievance	-.699	-.675	-.527
Sharp or severe economic decline	-.728	-.751	-.669
Criminalization/delegitimization of state	-.863	-.874	-.670
Progressive deterioration of public services	-.859	-.861	-.650
Widespread violation of human rights	-.783	-.797	-.577
Security apparatus as "state within a state"	-.777	-.792	-.620
Rise of factionalized elites	-.755	-.760	-.580
Intervention of other states/external actors	-.733	-.735	-.617
N	87	139	80

*Failed state indicators from <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindicators.php>, accessed May 15, 2006.

TABLE A3-3. *Model of Perceived Corruption: Gallup International Millennium Survey 2000*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t Ratio
Country governed by the will of the people	-.217****	.028	-7.88
All are equal under the law	.070****	.009	7.61
Government does good job handling crime	.084****	.009	9.48
Standard of living matters most in life	.037***	.014	2.57
Discrimination on political beliefs common	.035****	.007	5.13
Age	-.006**	.003	-1.68
Attended college/university	-.018	.018	-.99
Gini (You average index) transition countries	.006***	.002	2.77
Gini (You average index) other countries	.004****	.001	3.65
Constant	.093	.070	1.34

Estimates are regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by country

Number of countries: 52; Number of observations: 33,935

$R^2 = .225$; RMSE = 1.000

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .0001$ (all tests one-tailed except for constants)

TABLE A3-4. *Models of Grand and Petty Corruption a Problem: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004*

Variable	Grand Corruption				Petty Corruption			
	East Bloc		West Bloc		East Bloc		West Bloc	
	Coefficient	t	Coefficient	t	Coefficient	t	Coefficient	t
Affects own life	.037**	2.19	.071****	-5.65	.208****	-6.00	.077****	4.93
Offered bribe	.047**	-1.69	.001	.03	.049	.87	.044	1.21
Poverty problem	.240****	5.02	.317****	4.10	.241****	4.82	.200****	5.83
Human rights big problem	.188****	9.32	.235****	6.46	.252****	5.75	.261****	10.2
Family income	-.002	.01	-.005	.01	-.016	.014	.014**	1.69
Education	-.019*	-1.47	-.001	.01	.033	1.09	-.015*	-1.31
Age	-.031**	-1.93	-.003	-.33	-.033*	-1.64	-.028	-1.27
Gender	.016	1.07	.013	-.56	.014	.06	-.003	-1.15
Employed	.013	1.77	-.005	.01	-.007	-.04	.008	.65
Muslim	-.058	.07	-.149****	-2.19	.111	.83	-.120	-1.08
Catholic	-.071**	.04	-.047*	-1.34	.071	.67	-.027	-.49
Jewish	-.299****	-4.92	-.147****	-3.14	-1.173**	-1.68	-.469****	-7.20
You average Gini	.008****	5.02	-.001	.00	-.032	-2.47	.007**	2.19
Constant	.752****	.158	.870****	9.75	2.260****	5.28	9.604****	4.30

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .001; ****p < .0001 (all tests one-tailed except for constants)
Estimates are regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by country

Summary of Diagnostics for TI Global Corruption Barometer Models

	Grand Corruption				Petty Corruption			
	East Bloc		West Bloc		East Bloc		West Bloc	
		No Bloc				No Bloc		
N	7208	11629	10717		7331	11716	10742	
R ²	.164	.263	.337		.187	.253	.276	
RMSE	.635	.607	.765		.705	.660	.804	
Countries	12	16	19		12	16	19	

TABLE A3-5. *Model of Corruption Affects Own Life: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t Ratio
Offered bribe in last 12 months	.248****	.046	5.43
Poverty big problem	.125****	.027	4.70
Human rights big problem	.110****	.023	4.78
Medical system corrupt	.088****	.019	4.64
Education system corrupt	.100****	.016	6.08
Legal system corrupt	.056****	.017	3.35
Business corrupt	.036**	.018	2.01
Employed	-.023**	.012	-1.93
East bloc country	-.247	.153	-1.61
Gini (UNDP)	.010*	.007	1.46
Legal fairness	-.136***	.055	-2.47
Constant	1.989****	.438	4.54

Estimates are regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by country.

Number of countries: 52; Number of observations: 33,935

$R^2 = .225$; RMSE = 1.000

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .0001$ (all tests one-tailed except for constants)

TABLE A3-6. *Aggregate Model of Corruption Affects Own Life: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004*

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t Ratio
Average Gini (You data)	.011**	.006	1.82
Trust (imputed)	-.981**	.469	-2.09
Regulation of business (World Bank)	-.173*	.106	-1.64
Informal sector (Executive Opinion Survey)	.097*	.068	1.43
Constant	1.947*****	.399	4.88

$N = 51$; $R^2 = .635$; RMSE = .348

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .0001$ (all tests one-tailed except for constants)




FIGURE A3-1. Government Effectiveness Factor Scores (World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2004)




FIGURE A3-2.




FIGURE A3-3.

Pickpocketing and Economic Inequality
Former and Present Communist Countries Excluded




FIGURE A3-4.

Pickpocketing and Police Performance
ICVS Surveys




FIGURE A3-5.

TABLE A4-1. *Determinants of State Failure and Public Service Deterioration in Transition Countries*

Variable	State Failure			Public Service Deterioration		
	Coefficient	Standard Error	t Ratio	Coefficient	Standard Error	t Ratio
Corruption (TI 2005)	-7.019****	1.589	-4.42	-.418***	.130	-3.22
Change in inequality (WIDER)	17.683**	7.578	2.33	1.473**	.620	2.38
Democratization (Freedom House 2003)	-7.151**	3.068	-2.33	-.777***	.251	-3.09
Constant	66.884	11.775	5.68	4.973****	.964	5.16
R ²	.900			.896		
S.E.E.	5.866			.480		

N = 21

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .0001

TABLE A4-2. *Determinants of Service Interruption in Transition: Aggregate Models from BEEPS 2005 (Robust Standard Errors)*

Variable	Low Water Supply			Lack of Phone Service			Power Outages		
	b	S.E.	t Ratio	b	S.E.	t Ratio	b	S.E.	t Ratio
Change in Gini index (WIDER) 1989–99	5.84***	1.371	4.25	1.520***	.619	2.45	15.220**	7.211	2.11
Confident legal system enforce contracts and property rights	3.026**	1.79	1.69	.476	.824	.58	19.893**	8.459	2.35
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2004	–1.577***	.357	–4.20	–.484***	.199	–2.43	–5.998***	2.029	–2.96
Constant	–13.368**	6.308	–2.12	–1.497	3.054	–.49	–72.787**	30.177	–2.41
R ²		.684			.424			.535	
RMSE		2.030			.981			10.526	

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .0001
N = 21

TABLE A4-3. *Determinants of Shares of Business Sales on Credit in Transition BEEPS 2005 Aggregate Model (With Robust Standard Errors)*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t Ratio
Change in Gini index (WIDER) 1989-99	-18.551***	8.897	-2.53
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)	6.695****	1.504	4.45
Chamber of Commerce membership	28.374****	8.897	3.19
Constant	37.423**	13.206	2.83

RMSE = 6.16; $R^2 = .866$; $N = 21$

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .0001$




FIGURE A4-1. Changes in Economic Inequality (WIDER Measures) from 1989 to 1999: Transition Countries.




FIGURE A4-2.




FIGURE A4-3.

TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 Transition Countries




FIGURE A4-4.




FIGURE A4-5.




FIGURE A4-6.




FIGURE A4-7.




FIGURE A4-8.




FIGURE A4-9.




FIGURE A4-10.




FIGURE A4-11.




FIGURE A4-12.




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


FIGURE A4-14.




FIGURE A4-15.




FIGURE A4-I6.




FIGURE A4-I7.




FIGURE A4-18.




FIGURE A4-19.

TABLE A5-1. *Rankings on Transition Indicators for Romania*

Measure	Value	Transition Rank	# Ranked	Overall Rank	# Ranked
TI Corruption Index 2004	1.4	13	26	88/90	146
TI Corruption Index 2005	3	11	27	85/87	160
Change in Corruption TI 1998–2004	–1.6	8	11	28/32	85
Change in Corruption 1996–2004 World Bank	–.11	11	26	84/86	151
Trust	.16	19/20	21	82	94
Shadow economy share*	.34	10	21	47/48	90
Change in share of shadow economy 1989–2000*	.164	8	18	–	–
Gini index (WIDER) 1999*	.299	5	16	29	60
Gini index (Dutta/Mishra)*	.311	8	22	–	–
Change in Gini index (WIDER) 1989–99*	1.261	6	21	6	44
Change in Gini index (Rosser/Rosser/Ahmed)*	.048	7	16	–	–
Courts not fair (BEEPS 2002)*	.38	10	26	–	–
Rule of law (nations in transition) 2004*	4.38	10	27	–	–
Democratization (nations in transition) 2004*	3.25	10	27	–	–
GDP per capita Penn World Tables 2000	5023	17	23	77	136
GDP growth 1975–2003 UNDP	–.8	6	14	69	76
UN Human Development Index (1990)	.772	12	18	46/47	82
Uneven economic development (Failed States)*	6	6/8	27	33/39	146
Failed States Index*	62.6	11	27	102	146
Internal conflicts (ICRG)	10.5	14	20	32/56	154
Ethnic tensions (ICRG)	3.5	13/14	20	87/97	141

*Low values indicate better performance.

Rankings based upon number of transition countries rated. Multiple rankings indicate countries tied.

– Data not available or only transition countries ranked.

TABLE A5-2. *Perceptions of Romanians on Inequality, Corruption, Government Performance, Democracy, the Market, Fellow Citizens, Their Government, Connections, and Gift Payments*

Attitude	Percent Agreeing
Inequality has increased	91.6
Satisfied with the way democracy works	33.5
Satisfied with the way the market works	13.4
Most people can be trusted	34.1
Trust government	24.5
Is the current government fighting corruption	17.9
Corruption decreased in current government	8.1
Satisfied with government efforts to reduce corruption	10.1
Satisfied with government performance in fighting corruption	23.3
Government measures to fight corruption good	37.7
Satisfied with police fighting corruption	26.9
Satisfied with courts fighting corruption	21.9
Satisfied with media fighting corruption	64.4
Most members of parliament are corrupt	85.0
Most government ministers are corrupt	79.0
Most businesspeople are corrupt	75.0
Most politicians are corrupt	74.0
Most politicians are corrupt	69.0
Most members of local council are corrupt	58.0
Most teachers are corrupt	57.0
Most government functionaries are corrupt	56.0
Most professors are corrupt	36.0
Most journalists are corrupt	26.0
Satisfied with government performance on the quality of life	25.0
Satisfied with government performance on public safety	14.0
Satisfied with government performance on privatization	19.0
Have connections for medical treatment	35.1
Trust President	38.5
Trust Parliament	15.1
Trust city hall	43.9
Trust justice system	22.0
Trust police	36.7
Trust army	66.3
Trust political parties	9.9
Have connections for finding job	11.1
Have connections to rely on in the business world	6.6
Have connections for problem at city hall	20.7
Have connections to help get loan from bank	10.0
Have connections for problem with county government	5.4
Have connections to deal with courts/lawyers	11.6
Have connections to deal with police	15.6
Have connections to rely on in foreign country	11.2
Made "extra" payments to doctor	25.0
Made "extra" payments to bank in getting loan	.7
Made "extra" payments to police	1.4
Made "extra" payments to courts	3.2
Made "extra" payments to city officials	2.5
Made "extra" payments to county officials	.3

TABLE A5-3. *Likelihood that Romanians Would Pay an Atentie (Gift/Bribe) for Public Service: World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey 2000*

Public Service	Paying "Gift"	Paying "Gift" Voluntarily
Hospital stay	66	37
Emergency	62	29
Dentist	56	39
Medical specialist	52	33
Gas installation/repair	40	31
Power connection or repair	33	28
General practitioner	32	17
Building permit	29	19
Driving license	27	17
Vocational school	27	8
Elementary school	25	9
Real estate registration	22	16
Telephone connection/repair	22	16
Courts	22	16
High school	21	10
Loan application	19	8
Water connection/repair	18	15
University	17	9
Employment office	16	9
Passport	15	12
Unemployment benefits	11	7
Identity card	8	4
Police (crime victims only)	4	3

Source: Anderson et al. (2001, 13)

TABLE A5-4. *Simultaneous Equation Model of Optimism for the Future and Perceptions of Government Handling Corruption Well from Aggregated Surveys*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t Ratio
<i>Optimism for the future</i>			
Government success in controlling corruption	1.848****	.327	5.65
GDP growth rate (Penn World Tables)	2.838***	.890	3.19
Constant	39.894****	6.218	6.42
RMSE = 14.411; $R^2 = .591$; $N = 17$			
<i>Government success in controlling corruption</i>			
Optimism for the future	1.036****	.206	5.04
Informal market (Heritage Foundation)	-23.952***	8.401	-2.85
Constant	30.822	19.826	1.55
RMSE = 9.145; $R^2 = .702$; $N = 17$			

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .0001$

Endogenous variables in **bold**; endogenous dependent variables in *bold italics*.

Exogenous variables: Trust in justice, quality of life next year.

Growth rate in gross domestic product for the year taken from Penn World Tables from 1996–2000 and from <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/roum.pdf> for 2001–3. Informal market estimate and wage and price controls taken from Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads/PastScores.xls>.

TABLE A5-5. *Satisfaction with Democracy in Romania: Ordered Probit*

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t Ratio
Quality of life next year	.086**	.047	1.85
State of national economy in three years	.246****	.045	5.49
Life satisfaction	.187****	.054	3.44
Wealth (can afford consumer goods)	-.022	.012	-1.75
Performance of government on quality of life	.249***	.104	2.44
Performance of government in enhancing public safety	.364***	.124	2.94
Performance of government in reducing corruption	.238****	.049	4.89
Romania needs a strong leader	-.112***	.043	-2.62
State should control media and political parties	-.043**	.025	-1.75
Supporter of PSD (former Communist party)	.140****	.028	4.90
Age	-.003*	.002	-1.44
Made "extra" payments when visiting doctor	-.108*	-.080	-1.35
Made "extra" payments to court	-.324*	.200	-1.62
Made "extra" payments to city officials	-.030	.225	-.13
Made "extra" payments to county officials	1.804	.797	1.36
Made "extra" payments to police	-.189	.259	-.73
Made "extra" payments to bank	-.021	.399	-.53
Have any connections to rely upon ⁺	.069**	.034	2.07
Have connections to rely upon for medical treatment ⁺	.102	.070	1.46
Have any connections to rely upon in court/lawyer ⁺	.116	.100	1.16
Have any connections to rely upon at city hall ⁺	.116	.078	1.46
Have any connections to rely upon dealing with county ⁺	.091	.131	.69
Have any connections to rely upon for police problem ⁺	.181**	.078	2.06
Have any connections to rely upon for bank loan ⁺	.198**	.103	1.93
Have any connections to rely upon for finding job ⁺	.157*	.102	1.54
Have any connections to rely upon in business world ⁺	.013	.121	.11
Have any connections to rely upon in foreign country	-.249**	.099	-2.51

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .0001

-2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 2560.94; N = 1082

Coefficients for variables other than "connections" are for "any connections." Cut points omitted.

⁺ Two-tailed test of significance (all other tests one-tailed).

TABLE A5-6. *Satisfaction with Market Economy in Romania: Ordered Probit*

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	t Ratio
Quality of life next year	.125***	.045	2.79
Satisfaction with income	.085**	.051	1.68
Life satisfaction	.108**	.058	1.87
Wealth (can afford consumer goods)	-.020	.013	-1.56
Performance of government on quality of life	.424***	.103	4.10
Performance of government in enhancing public safety	.188*	.124	1.52
Performance of government in reducing corruption	.254***	.048	5.33
Most businesspeople are corrupt	-.086**	.04	-2.13
Trust in private firms	.178****	.036	5.01
Age	.001	.002	.69
Made "extra" payments when visiting doctor	-.069	.078	-.89
Made "extra" payments to court	.068	.177	.39
Made "extra" payments to city officials	.249	.206	1.21
Made "extra" payments to county officials	.134	.804	.17
Made "extra" payments to police	-.226	.277	-.82
Made "extra" payments to bank	-.090	.399	-.23
Have any connections to rely upon	-.044*	.034	-1.30
Have connections to rely upon for medical treatment	.006	.071	.09
Have any connections to rely upon in court/lawyer	-.106	.102	-1.03
Have any connections to rely upon at city hall	-.051	.081	-.63
Have any connections to rely upon dealing with county	-.151	.139	-1.08
Have any connections to rely upon for police problem	-.047	.088	-.05
Have any connections to rely upon for bank loan	-.129	.105	-1.22
Have any connections to rely upon for finding job	-.132	.102	-1.29
Have any connections to rely upon in business world	.185	.805	.23
Have any connections to rely upon in foreign country	-.351***	.102	-3.45

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .0001$

-2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 2462.92; N = 1086

Coefficients for variables other than "connections" are for "any connections." Cut points omitted.

TABLE A5-7. *Trust in Government Scale in Romania: Regression Analysis*

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t Ratio
Generalized trust	.213***	.048	4.41
Direction of country right or wrong	.237***	.051	4.65
Inequality change	-.097**	.035	2.78
Wealth (can afford consumer goods)	.000	.007	.02
Performance of government on quality of life	.103*	.065	1.58
Performance of government in enhancing public safety	.588****	.080	7.37
Performance of government in reducing corruption	.231****	.032	7.14
Supporter of PSD (reformed Communist party now in power)	.237****	.019	12.73
State should control media and political parties	-.031**	.017	-1.89
Live in Bucharest (capital)	-.284****	.069	-4.14
Frequency attendance at religious services	.027*	.018	1.50
Frequency of contact with officials	.049***	.019	2.57
Made "extra" payments when visiting doctor	.025	.055	.45
Made "extra" payments to court	-.049	.136	-.36
Made "extra" payments to city officials	.245	.144	1.70
Made "extra" payments to county officials	-.174	.364	-.48
Made "extra" payments to police	-.051	.176	-.29
Made "extra" payments to bank	.053	.239	.22
Have any connections to rely upon	-.00003	.176	-.29
Have connections to rely upon for medical treatment	-.002	.048	-.04
Have any connections to rely upon in court/lawyer	.046	.068	.69
Have any connections to rely upon at city hall	.053	.057	.92
Have any connections to rely upon dealing with county	.005	.094	.05
Have any connections to rely upon for police problem	.027	.060	.45
Have any connections to rely upon for bank loan	.008	.073	.12
Have any connections to rely upon for finding job	-.119**	.067	-1.79
Have any connections to rely upon in business world	-.046	.082	-.56
Have any connections to rely upon in foreign country	-.158**	.068	-2.30

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .0001

R² = .481; RMSE = .708; N = 1052

Coefficients for variables other than "connections" are for "any connections."

TABLE A6-1. *Rankings on Transition Indicators for Estonia and Slovakia*

Measure	Estonia			Slovakia		
	Value	Transition Rank	Total Rank	Value	Transition Rank	Total Rank
TI Corruption Index 2004	4.0	1	31/33	2.5	6	57/58
TI Corruption Index 2005	6.4	1	27	4.3	5	47/50
Change in Corruption TI 1998–2004	–1.7	4	33/35	–1.4	2	20/23
Change in Corruption 1996–2004 World Bank Trust	.79	2	6	–.09	14	83
	.22	12/13	62/68	.23	15/16	58/61
Shadow economy share*	–	–	–	.189	1	83
Change in share of shadow economy 1989–2000*	–	–	–	.12	5	–
Gini index (WIDER) 1999*	.401	12	36	.249	1	16
Gini index (Dutta/Mishra)*	.376	15	–	.262	4	–
Change in Gini index (WIDER) 1989–1999*	1.585	13	33	1.245	4	28/29
Change in Gini index (Rosser/Rosser/Ahmed)*	.127	14	–	0	1	–
Courts not fair (BEEPS 2002)*	.276	1	–	.347	7	–
Rule of law (nations in transition) 2004*	2.13	3	–	2.63	5/6	–
Democratization (nations in transition) 2004*	1.94	6	–	1.81	3/4	–
GDP per capita Penn World Tables 2000	10873	5	40	12619	3	36
GDP growth 1975–2003 UNDP	.4	3	54/56	.5	2	53
UN Human Development Index (1990)	.812	6	37	.831	3	31
Uneven economic development (Failed States)*	5	3	20/27	6.5	13	47/48
Failed States Index*	51	7	111	49.9	6	112
Internal conflicts (ICRG)	11.5	1/4	4/17	11	5/8	4/17
Ethnic tensions (ICRG)	2.5	19	118/125	3.5	13/14	87/97

* Low values indicate better performance.

Rankings based upon number of transition countries rated. Multiple rankings indicate countries tied.

– Data not available or only transition countries ranked.

TABLE A6-2. *Perceptions of the Consequences of Corruption: World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Surveys of the Romanian and Slovakian Publics and Elites Proportion Naming Each Consequence as First or Second Most Important*

Consequence	Romania		Slovakia		
	Public	Entrepreneurs	Public	Entrepreneurs	Officials
Increase inequality	.53	.37	.37	.31	.43
Lowers income	.53	.41	.20	.22	.25
Infringes on human rights	.17	.07	.17	.20	.35
Contributes to dishonesty	.11	.14	.15	.32	.36
Leads to increased crime	.12	.09	.15	.28	.32
Contributes to moral decline	.15	.23	.38	.20	.32
Hurts transition	.05	.09	.25	.22	.25
Lose confidence in one's own abilities	NA	NA	.27	.31	.27
Hurts private enterprise	.04	.18	.09	.21	.20
Leads to loss of foreign investment	.12	.26	.29	.38	.27
Endangers security of state	.18	.14	.20	.10	.31

TABLE A6-3. *Probit Analysis of Perceptions of How Corruption Increases Economic Inequality: World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of the Slovakian Public*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	MLE/SE	Effect
Corruption causes crime	-1.273****	.111	-11.47	-.376
Corruption causes human rights violations	-1.469****	.182	-8.08	-.356
Corruption hurts development of private sector	-.484***	.163	-2.96	-.133
Corruption hurts transition	-1.124****	.206	-5.45	-.279
Must bribe courts because courts not fair	-.040	.041	-.99	-.046
Bribe part of everyday life	-.009	.047	-.20	-.008
Social class	.017	.038	.43	.033
Constant	.427*	.253	1.68	

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .0001

Estimated R² = .520; -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 912.178; N = 903

Percent predicted correctly: 75.4 (model); 62.1 (null)

TABLE A6-4. *Probit Analysis of Perceptions of How Corruption Increases Economic Inequality: World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of the Romanian Entrepreneurs*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	MLE/SE	Effect
Corruption is abuse of position	.264*	.163	1.62	.080
Corruption leads investors to lose confidence in Romania	-.562***	.190	-2.96	-.165
Corruption leads to moral decline in society	-.969****	.206	-4.71	-.275
Corruption slows development of private sector	-1.210****	.243	-4.97	-.320
Competitors don't pay fair share of taxes	.096**	.047	2.03	.117
Low pay major cause of corruption	.286**	.161	1.77	.088
Government has greatest responsibility for fighting corruption	.982***	.397	2.48	.307
Political instability hinders my company	.188**	.110	1.71	.212
Member business association	-.347**	.187	-1.85	-.103
Constant	-1.120*	.468	-2.39	

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .0001

Estimated R² = .422; -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 331.66; N = 309

Percent predicted correctly: 71.2 (model); 63.8 (null)

TABLE A6-5. *Probit Analysis of Perceptions of How Corruption Increases Economic Inequality: World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of Slovakian Entrepreneurs*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	MLE/SE	Effect
Corruption is abuse of position	-.464	.222	-2.09	-.099
Corruption causes human rights violations	-2.088****	.599	-3.49	-.261
Corruption hurts transition	-1.098****	.322	-3.41	-.195
Corruption hurts development of private sector	-.792***	.281	-2.82	-.148
Corruption caused by ordinary citizens	.485**	.275	1.76	.111
Deputies really want to solve corruption	-.204*	.144	-1.42	-.127
Gift payments obstacle to business development	.917****	.231	3.98	.210
Income change in business from 1998 to 1999	-.007***	.003	-2.36	-.392
Constant	-1.120*	.468	-2.39	

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .0001

Estimated R² = .723; -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 186.241; N = 244

Percent predicted correctly: 81.2 (model); 78.3 (null)

TABLE A6-6. *Probit Analysis of Perceptions of How Corruption Increases Economic Inequality: World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of Slovakian Officials*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	MLE/SE	Effect
Corruption is abuse of position	.298**	.176	-1.69	-.088
Corruption causes human rights violations	-1.202****	.275	-4.38	-.286
Corruption causes increase in crime	-1.235****	.208	-5.94	-.318
Corruption endangers security of state	-1.075***	.334	-3.22	-.282
Corruption hurts transition	-1.047****	.242	-4.33	-.286
Corruption leads foreign investors to lose confidence	-.742****	.203	-3.67	-.213
Corruption caused by weak legal system	-.200	.270	-.74	-.058
Corruption increased over past three years	.010	.089	.11	.012
Is there corruption in education system	.053	.113	.05	.031
Education	-.354**	.158	-2.23	-.211
Constant	2.154**	.702	3.07	

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .0001

Estimated R² = .444; -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 285.154; N = 271

Percent predicted correctly: 72.7 (model); 57.2 (null)

TABLE A6-7. *Ordered Probit Analysis of Trust in Government: World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of Slovakian Entrepreneurs*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	MLE/SE	Effect
Corruption causes inequality	.070	.201	.035	.010
Corruption increased in past three years	-.236**	.114	-2.07	-.065
Parliament is corrupt	-.282***	.084	-3.27	-.157
Bureaucracy obstacle to business development	-.227**	.098	-2.32	-.117
Clientelism obstacle to business development	-.010	.088	-.01	-.006
Infrastructure obstacle to business development	-.147**	.075	-1.96	-.085
Quality of services traffic police	.188***	.077	2.44	.103
Quality of services energy	.161**	.089	1.82	.094

Cut points not reported. Effects are average changes in probabilities across the five categories of trust in government. The effects represent the changes from each value to *the next higher value*.

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .0001

Estimated R² = .105; -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 487.604; N = 202

TABLE A6-8. *Ordered Probit Analysis of Trust in Government: World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of Slovakian Officials*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	MLE/SE	Effect
Corruption causes inequality	.226	.195	1.16	.033
Corruption increased in past three years	-.271***	.100	-2.70	-.151
Corruption caused by weak court	-.039	.305	-.13	-.006
Ministries are corrupt	-.238**	.138	-1.72	-.068
Education system is corrupt	-.022	.126	-.17	-.006
Traffic courts are corrupt	-.032	.128	-.25	-.009
Health system is corrupt	-.172*	.131	-1.32	-.045
Central administration takes bribes for influencing decisions	-.266**	.137	-1.94	-.139
Embezzlement in central administration	-.252**	.137	-1.83	-.068
Offered small gift in past two years	-.054	-.120	-.45	-.067
Gift payments for services common	-.333*	.232	-1.44	-.050
Central administration: poor quality	-.013	.195	-1.16	-.008
Social class	-.045	.110	-.41	-.026

Cut points not reported. Effects are average changes in probabilities across the five categories of trust in government. The effects represent the changes from each value to the next higher value.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .0001$

Estimated $R^2 = .151$; $-2 \times \text{Log Likelihood Ratio} = 313.386$; $N = 141$

TABLE A7-1. *Ordered Probit Analysis of Corruption Increasing Since Period of One-Party Rule: 2002 Afrobarometer in Mali*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	MLE/SE	Effect
Equal treatment for all: better now than under military	-.120***	.039	-3.10	-.091
Government policies hurt or help most people	-.084**	.037	-2.24	-.063
President favors own region in providing services	.080**	.045	1.76	.045
Electricity difficult to get because of high cost	.393****	.097	4.05	.074
Elected leaders corrupt	.162***	.055	2.96	.089
Police corrupt	.230***	.079	2.91	.125
Civil servants corrupt	.120**	.061	1.97	.066
Businesspeople corrupt	.066	.073	.91	.037
Teachers corrupt	-.023	.043	-.55	-.013
Customs officers corrupt	-.109	.084	-1.30	-.063
Bribery is rare among public officials	-.086**	.047	-1.82	-.048
Need to bribe to get services entitled to	-.044	.049	-.89	-.025
Can get cash through illicit sources	.301***	.094	3.22	.056
How often Malians get services without paying	.095**	.037	2.02	.054
Trust courts	.036	.039	.92	.020
Generalized trust	.024	.133	.18	.005

Cut points not reported. Effects are average changes in probabilities across the five categories of trust in government. The effects represent the changes from each value to *the next higher value*.

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .0001

Estimated R² = .100; -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 1512.49; N = 618

TABLE A7-2. *Ordered Probit Analysis of Limiting Incomes of the Wealthy: 2002 Afrobarometer in Mali*

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	MLE/SE	Effect
Government manages reducing income gap well	-.077**	.037	-2.06	-.035
Equal treatment for all: better now than under military	-.047*	.033	-1.43	-.029
Important education provided free for everyone	.162***	.052	3.14	.075
Individuals/community should own land	.077***	.032	2.42	.047
Government/people responsible for economy	.081****	.024	3.39	.049
Bribery is rare among public officials	-.069**	.041	-1.70	.032
Need to bribe to get services entitled to	-.044	.042	-1.05	-.020
Government handles corruption well	-.090**	.038	-2.34	-.042
Teachers are corrupt	-.013	.037	-.35	-.006
Elected leaders corrupt	.020	.049	.42	.009
Police corrupt	.064	.055	.98	.029
Civil servants corrupt	.027	.053	.50	.012
Foreign businesspeople corrupt	-.119	.056	-2.10	-.035
How often do Malians evade taxes	-.060	.054	-1.11	-.028
How often Malians get services without paying	.151***	.056	2.68	.069
Trust courts	.011	.035	.32	.005
Trust members of other tribes	-.105***	.036	2.91	-.049
How safe walking alone	-.066**	.030	-2.19	-.041
Self, family member, or friend attacked in year	.068	.082	.84	.010
How satisfied with life expectations next year	-.027	.036	-.76	-.017

Cut points not reported. Effects are average changes in probabilities across the five categories of trust in government. The effects represent the changes from each value to the next higher value.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .0001$

Estimated $R^2 = .050$; $-2 \times \text{Log Likelihood Ratio} = 2153.83$; $N = 842$

TABLE A7-3. *Selected Institutional and Demographic Comparisons: Sweden, Singapore, and Hong Kong*

Indicator	Mean	Sweden	Singapore	Hong Kong
UNDP Human Development 1975	.600	.864	.761	.725
UNDP Human Development 1995	.680	.958	.882	.861
GDP per capita 1989 (PennWorld Tables)	6022.92	17717.14	13730.89	17389.74
GDP per capita 2000 (PennWorld Tables)	9520.86	24628.44	28643.59	27892.50
Openness of economy 1989 (PennWorld Tables)	69.09	57.01	291.63	182.67
Openness of economy 2000 (PennWorld Tables)	87.36	91.15	—	309.58
Overall risk rating (ICRG)	70.35	87.8	87.8	83.5
Democratic accountability (ICRG)	4.02	6.0	2.0	2.5
Real GDP growth (ICRG)	8.67	8.5	9.0	9.0
Ethnic tensions (ICRG)	4.02	5.0	6.0	5.0
Judicial independence (freetheworld.com)	6.27	8.68	7.35	7.68
Legal/property rights (freetheworld.com)	5.84	9.02	8.53	7.23
Impartial courts (freetheworld.com)	5.90	8.35	7.68	8.85
Tariffs (freetheworld.com)	7.20	9.25	9.94	9.93
Country is corrupt (Gallup Millennium 2000)	.39	.11	.01	.07
Country run by will of the people (Gallup Millennium 2000)	.35	.40	.61	.40
Hidden trade barriers (World Economic Forum)	4.53	6.3	6.3	5.8
Bureaucratic red tape (World Economic Forum)	2.73	2.4	2.3	2.3
Effective lawmaking (World Economic Forum)	3.43	5.0	6.0	3.6
Ethical firms (World Economic Forum)	4.35	6.1	5.9	5.1
Charitable involvement (World Economic Forum)	4.53	3.9	5.4	5.5

Measures come from the United Nations Human Development Program, the Penn World Tables, Free the World (<http://www.freetheworld.com>), the Gallup Millennium Survey (2000), the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey (2004); and the InterCountry Risk Group (2005). See Chapter 3 for the specific citations.




FIGURE A7-1. Lowess Plots for Real GDP Per Capita Over Time: Singapore and Hong Kong.



FIGURE A8-1. Proportions Agreeing That You Must Be Corrupt to Reach the Top and Income Differences Are Too Large, 1999 ISSP.